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And What Will Europe Do? The European 
Council and Military Strategy  
Sven Biscop 
Important  decisions  on  Europe’s  military 
capabilities  are  expected  from  the 
December  2013  European  Council.  But 
why? What do Europeans actually want to 
do  with  their  capabilities?  The  answer  to 
that question would be the crowning piece 
of the European Council’s decisions. 
Pooling  &  Sharing  of  military  capabilities, 
procedures  and  institutions  for  crisis 
management, and defence industry are on the 
agenda of the European Council for December 
2013. But as the highest political body of the 
European Union, the European Council, at the 
instigation of its President, will likely also want 
to discuss the political dimension of European 
defence. The fundamental political question is 
deceptively  simple  –  and  has  always  been 
conveniently ignored: why? EU Member States 
collectively have yet to say why Europe needs 
the  military.  The  2003  European  Security 
Strategy  (ESS)  states  that  “Europe  should  be 
ready to share in the responsibility for global 
security and in building a better world”: grand 
but vague.  
 
The  political  question  is  the  strategic 
question  therefore:  apart  from  defending  its 
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own territory, which role exactly does Europe 
with  all  its  capabilities  aspire  to  as  a  security 
provider?  
 
Europe, not the CSDP. In his speech at the 
annual conference of the European Defence 
Agency  (EDA)  on  21  March  2013,  Herman 
Van  Rompuy  clearly  expressed  his  main 
concern to be not the Common Security and 
Defence  Policy  as  such,  but  “the  state  of 
defence in Europe”.
1 Obvious it may be, but 
never  officially  stated  before:  one  can  only 
draw  the  maximum  benefit  from  Pooling  & 
Sharing if the total armed forces of all Member 
States  are  taken  into  the  balance.  The 
capabilities debate cannot be limited to some 
theoretically separable part of the armed forces 
available to the CSDP. Similarly, the strategic 
debate  that  should  drive  capability 
development  cannot  be  limited  to  some 
aspects  likely  to  be  acted  upon  through  the 
CSDP.  The  challenge  is  to  define  overall 
priorities  for  the  use  of  the  military 
instrument,  in  function  of  the  vital  interests 
and  the  foreign  policy  of  the  EU  and  its 
Member  States,  without  any  prejudice  to 
action under UN, NATO, CSDP or national 
command  –  the  crisis  will  determine  that 
choice in each individual case.  
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INTERESTS DRIVE RESPONSIBILITIES  
At  its  December  2012  meeting,  where  the 
agenda  for  the  December  2013  meeting  was 
set,  the  European  Council  “note[d]  that  in 
today’s changing world the European Union is 
called upon to assume increased responsibilities 
in the maintenance of international peace and 
security in order to guarantee the security of its 
citizens and the promotion of its interests”.  
 
As a starting point, the European Council 
could now emphasize that in spite of the many 
differences  in  the  focus  of  national  foreign 
policies  and  threat  perceptions,  the  Member 
States  as  an  integrated  economy  with  a 
distinctive  social  model  do  indeed  share  vital 
interests:  
  Preventing threats against their territory 
from materializing;  
  Keeping  open  all  lines  of  interaction 
with  the  world,  notably  sea  lanes, 
pipelines, and cyberspace.  
  Assuring  the  supply  of  energy  and 
natural resources for the economy;  
  Managing  migration  in  order  to 
maintain both a viable work force and a 
viable social system;  
  Mitigating the impact of climate change;  
  Strengthening  international  law  as  a 
fundament  of  international  stability, 
notably  the  UN  Charter  and  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights;  
  Preserving  the  autonomy  of  their 
decision-making  by  preventing  undue 
dependence on any foreign power.  
 
Europeans  need  not  be  timid  about  the  fact 
that they too seek to defend their interests – 
that is the point of policy-making – as long as 
they continue to do so in a way that does not 
harm the legitimate interests of others.  
 
The  regions  and  contingencies  in  which 
their vital interests are most directly threatened 
by the potential use of force should form the 
priority areas of focus for a European military 
strategy. These constitute the responsibilities that 
Europeans  assume  as  a  security  provider 
outside their own territory, and are therefore 
willing to act upon. In (1) crisis management, 
Europeans must be able to act across the full 
spectrum  of  expeditionary  operations,  from 
evacuation, support to humanitarian relief, and 
assistance and training, to peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement  and  indeed  war.  But  a  military 
strategy  also  encompasses  (2)  prevention,  by 
way  of  maintaining  a  permanent  forward 
presence in priority areas, and (3) deterrence, 
by  maintaining  a  credible  power  projection 
capacity at all times.
2  
 
Setting  priorities  does  not  mean  that 
Europeans will never address any other issues, 
but that this is what they will prepare and plan 
for. Nor does it mean that the military is the 
only instrument with which these priorities will 
be  addressed,  but  that  because  of  their 
importance Europeans must be prepared to act 
forcefully  if,  and  only  if,  its  permanent 
preventive policies fail. Even then the military 
will  always  be  one  dimension  of  a 
comprehensive  approach  aiming  at  a  clear 
political end-state.  
 
The  context  in  which  priorities  must  be 
decided upon is one of austerity budgets. That 
simply  makes  prioritisation  even  more 
important:  when  the  means  are  limited, 
political guidance is crucial to assure that what 
means  we  do  have  are  spent  in  the  most 
relevant  way.  The  shift  of  the  American 
strategic  focus  to  the  Asia-Pacific  region  is 
another  major  factor.  The  “pivot”  does  not 
determine what European priorities are – our 
interests do that – but in limiting the extent to 
which  American  capabilities  can  be  counted 
upon it does determine how many European 
capabilities will be required.  
 
Analysing  Europe’s  vital  interests  and  the 
potential  violent  threats  against  them,  three 
priority responsibilities emerge:    3 
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  Taking the lead in assuring peace and 
security  in  Europe’s  “broader 
neighbourhood”.  
  Contributing  to  global  maritime 
security.  
  Contributing  to  the  collective  security 
system of the UN.  
 
REGIONAL LEAD  
 “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is 
still  important”,  states  the  ESS.  The  most 
obvious  priority  undoubtedly  is  to  maintain 
peace  and  security  in  Europe’s  own 
neighbourhood,  where  its  vital  interests  are 
directly at stake.  
 
Geographically,  this  zone  of  responsibility 
extends  beyond  the  area  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy  (Eastern  Europe,  the 
Caucasus, the Maghreb and the Middle East), 
encompassing  what  are  now  often 
called  “the  neighbours  of  the 
neighbours” in the Sahel, the Horn of 
Africa, and the Gulf (and to a lesser 
extent  Central  Asia).  All  of  these 
regions as such are important to our 
vital interests and many of them form 
“security  complexes”,  i.e.  their  security  is 
inextricably  linked  together  (as  we  have 
witnessed in the Maghreb and the Sahel e.g.). 
That this broad region, both east and south of 
Europe, is very volatile and will see a high risk 
of inter as well as intra-state conflict for years 
to come needs no further explanation.  
 
To which extent do we feel responsible for 
this  “broader  neighbourhood”,  i.e.  in  which 
scenarios must military action be considered?  
 
Inter-state war, including spill-over of a civil 
war into neighbouring countries, must certainly 
always  be  prevented  or  ended.  In  such  a 
scenario,  the  UN  Security  Council  is  more 
likely  (though  not  guaranteed)  to  seize  the 
matter, and Europe will then probably act as 
part of a broader coalition, notably with the US, 
and preferably always with regional actors – but 
alone if it is the only option. In any scenario a 
major contribution will be expected.  
 
Intra-state  conflict,  particularly  when  the 
Responsibility  to  Protect  (R2P)  arises  (i.e.  in 
case  of  war  crimes,  crimes  against  humanity, 
genocide or ethnic cleansing), would ideally be 
addressed  by  regional  actors.  The  will  and 
certainly  the  means  to  do  so  remain  limited 
however,  hence  European  intervention  will 
often prove necessary. In such cases, Europe is 
more  likely  to  be  the  only  or  certainly  the 
leading  external  actor,  preferably  still  in 
coalition with regional actors, as in Libya (2011) 
and Mali (2013). Unless the government of the 
country  in  question  requests  intervention,  a 
UNSC mandate is much less certain. As in Syria 
today, but also in Georgia (2008), the military 
feasibility  may  be  constrained  by  the 
implication of external powers, the chance that 
any benefits are outweighed by major negative 
side  effects,  or  an  unacceptably  high  risk  of 
casualties. Intervention may then be limited to 
preventing  spill-over  and  possibly  supporting 
the legitimate party in the conflict.  
 
Whether  it  intervened  or  not,  Europe 
definitely  has  a  responsibility  to  stabilize  any 
post-conflict  situation,  including  through 
peacekeeping,  SSR/DDR,  and  training  and 
assisting  local  armed  forces  (as  well  as  the 
security  and  justice  apparatus).  On  a  more 
permanent  basis,  a  military  presence  through 
cooperation  with  regional  partners  can  be  an 
important  confidence  and  security-building 
measure,  provided  it  is  firmly  anchored  in  a 
broader political partnership and does not run 
counter  to  EU  objectives  in  the  field  of 
democracy and human rights.  
“Europeans  must  be  able  to  act 
across  the  full  spectrum  of 
expeditionary operations”   4 
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In  view  of  its  proximity  and  the  extent t o  
which its vital interests are at stake, it is Europe’s 
responsibility to take the lead in maintaining peace 
and security in this broad region. The crises in 
the  aftermath  of  the  Arab  Spring  have 
demonstrated  that  proclaiming  an  ambitious 
Neighbourhood Policy but abstaining as soon as 
any  security  problem  arises  is  not  an  option. 
Policy  towards  the  region  must  be 
comprehensive,  and  thus  include  peace  and 
security,  or  will  remain  but  a  set  of  empty 
promises. That does not necessarily always imply 
taking  the  lead  militarily,  but  in  any  case 
politically: putting any crisis on the agenda of the 
regional  and  international  community,  and 
forging a coalition for action. While the US will 
undoubtedly continue to play a role, Europeans 
will  increasingly  define  the  strategic  and 
operational priorities.  
 
GLOBAL CONTRIBUTION: ON SEA  
The  ESS  also  states  that  “in  an  era  of 
globalisation, distant threats may be as much a 
concern  as  those  that  are  near  at  hand”.  The 
most direct as well as most likely threat of force 
to their vital interests that Europeans face is a 
disruption of maritime trade (which accounts for 
90% of Europe’s trade overall).  
 
Maritime  security  is  most  commonly 
associated with piracy in the Gulf of Aden, but 
obviously  the  very  same  trade  route  can  be 
threatened  anywhere  between  there  and  the 
ports  of  China,  and  that  would  be  equally 
problematic. Europeans thus have a vital interest 
in maritime security in Asia, as well as in other 
parts  of  the  globe  such  as  West  Africa. 
Furthermore,  Somali  piracy  has  demonstrated 
that maritime problems are rarely solved at sea 
only. That does not just hold true for the threat 
of  piracy  (which  is  present  in  Asia  and  West 
Africa too). The other main threat to maritime 
security in Asia is a function of the tensions 
between  China  and  its  neighbours  –  which 
clearly calls for more than gunboat diplomacy.  
 
A  commitment  to  maintaining  global 
maritime  security  thus  has  far-reaching 
implications. It is beyond Europe’s means to 
play  a  leading  role  in  maritime  security 
worldwide, but it can justifiably be expected, 
and  it  is  in  its  interest,  to  take  the  lead  in 
addressing  maritime  issues  in  its  broader 
neighbourhood  and  adjacent  zones. 
Europeans  have  proven  themselves 
able to deal with non-state actors, the 
most  likely  threat,  like  in  the  case  of 
Somalia, though success still requires a 
broad  international  and  regional 
coalition.  Europe  is  well-placed  to 
forge  such  coalitions,  and  to  initiate  the 
broader  comprehensive  strategy  that  is 
required  to  address  the  underlying  causes  of 
piracy.  Less  likely  but  dramatic  if  it  would 
materialize is a blockage of the main artery of 
the  Suez  canal  as  a  consequence  of  inter  or 
intra-state  war.
3  That  too  would  likely  be  a 
crisis which the UNSC would seize and upon 
which an international coalition would act, of 
which  Europeans  would  have  to  be  a  major 
part.  
 
In Asia, local and regional actors should be 
counted upon to tackle problems of piracy, but 
a  European  contribution  would  demonstrate 
how serious the international community takes 
the  issue,  thus  adding  to  the  credibility  and 
effectiveness of the effort. Moreover, a small 
but  significant  permanent  naval  presence, 
engaging  in  exchanges,  training,  manoeuvres, 
and  patrolling  with  regional  partners  and 
promoting multinational cooperation between 
them,  would  constitute  an  important 
confidence and security-building measure and 
contribute  to  diluting  tensions  between 
competing  powers.  Such  a  distinctive 
European  naval  presence  would  complement 
wider European diplomatic efforts at conflict 
“It  is  Europe’s  responsibility  to 
take the lead in maintaining peace 
and security in this broad region”   5 
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prevention  and  region-building,  and  would  be 
much  more  effective  than  adding  the  odd 
European ship to the American fleet.  
 
In  the  Arctic,  finally,  the  main  issue  is 
maritime safety rather than security. Here too, 
Europeans  by  being  present  themselves  can 
promote multinational cooperation between the 
various other actors with a stake in the region.  
 
GLOBAL CONTRIBUTION: ON LAND  
Given  the  volatility  of  their  own  near  abroad, 
chances are that Europeans’ appetite and means 
to engage in crisis management elsewhere will be 
limited.  Yet,  Europe  cannot  ignore  crisis  and 
suffering  in  other  parts  of  the  globe.  At  first 
sight its own vital interests may be less directly at 
stake in conflicts in Sub-Sahara Africa 
e.g., but abidance by the fundamentals 
of international law, i.e. the non-use of 
force and respect for human rights, is a 
vital interest as such. Without a general 
climate  of  abidance  by  international 
law, there can be no international stability and 
thus  no  flourishing  international  trade,  nor 
multilateral  cooperation  on  pressing  global 
challenges.  Such  a  climate  can  only  be  upheld 
when  international  law  is  upheld  and  gross 
infringements are consistently acted upon.  
 
“The  United  Nations  Security  Council  has 
the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security”, states the ESS, 
adding  immediately  that  “Strengthening  the 
United  Nations,  equipping  it  to  fulfil  its 
responsibilities  and  to  act  effectively,  is  a 
European priority”. For indeed, not only are two 
of  the  permanent  members  of  the  UNSC 
European, Europeans need an effective UN in 
case of crisis in their own near abroad. And the 
UN can only be effective if it is perceived to be 
effective generally, and not just in contingencies 
in  which  the  interests  of  the  permanent 
members are directly at stake.  
 
Europeans have a responsibility therefore to 
contribute  to  the  UN  collective  security 
system.  That  contribution  need  not  just  be 
counted  in  European  blue  helmets  – a t  t h e  
request  of  the  UN  Europeans  can  deploy 
under  NATO,  CSDP  or  national  command, 
including in support of regional organisations 
such as the African Union and ECOWAS – 
but  it  cannot  be  limited  to  paying  into  the 
budget  of  the  Department  of  Peacekeeping 
Operations.  
 
Europeans  cannot  and  should  not 
contribute  to  each  and  every  UN  (led  or 
requested)  operation.  Further  prioritization 
within  this  priority  responsibility  is  needed. 
R2P can serve as one guideline: having come 
into being thanks only to a major European 
diplomatic  effort,  surely  whenever  the 
mechanism is activated Europeans should now 
also  contribute  to  its  implementation. 
Concentration and consistency of effort could 
be another guideline. As the case of the Congo 
illustrates,  small-scale  operations  of  fixed 
duration,  even  when  successful,  rarely  create 
durable effects. A small (relative to the overall 
size of the force) but permanent contribution 
of  European  combat  forces  to  the  UN 
operation in the DRC would surely have had a 
lot  more  impact  than  the  two  short-term 
CSDP operations in 2003 and 2006, necessary 
though they were at the time.  
 
RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES 
CAPABILITIES  
Assuming responsibility requires capabilities. If 
the European Council can agree on strategic 
priorities, it should translate these into a level 
of  ambition:  how  many  capabilities  must 
Europeans  devote  to  them?  This  will  then 
serve as political guidance for defence planning 
“Maritime  problems  are  rarely 
solved at sea only”   6 
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and capability development at the European and 
national level.  
 
The current European level of ambition for 
expeditionary operations still is to deploy up to 
an  army  corps  or  60,000  troops,  within  two 
months, and sustain it for at least one year, as 
per the 1999 Headline Goal (HG). During the 
last  decade  Europeans  have  consistently 
deployed  more  than  60,000,  counting  all 
national, NATO, CSDP and UN operations in 
which they participated. But if a grave crisis had 
arisen  elsewhere,  only  through  serious 
improvisation could they have deployed a corps 
in addition to all these on-going operations. And 
never  have  they  undertaken  major  operations 
autonomously, i.e. relying on European enablers 
and in implementation of a European strategy. 
That  is  precisely  what  will  be  required  in  the 
future however, as the US expects Europeans to 
take  charge  of  security  in  their  own 
neighbourhood, initiating European policies and 
acting  upon  them  with  European  means  (and 
thus allowing the reallocation of US assets).  
 
Europe’s  preference  is  for  operations  with 
the lightest possible footprint, at an early stage 
before a problem escalates, in support of local 
and regional forces (air operations, as in Libya, 
or  training  missions,  as  in  Somalia  and  Mali). 
Given the customary reticence of local parties to 
see large numbers of western soldiers on their 
territories,  and  the  wish  of  European 
governments  and  public  opinion  to  avoid 
casualties  in  their  own  ranks,  this  is  quite 
justified. It would be a strategic error though to 
assume that all crises can thus be solved. An 
air campaign can only achieve effect it there 
are friendly forces on the ground to support in 
the  first  place.  The  Mali  case  illustrates  that 
combat  operations  (ideally  short  and  sharp) 
may be necessary to create the preconditions 
for training missions and local ownership to be 
at  all  feasible.  Even  if  in  Somalia  today  this 
approach is gradually yielding results, it should 
not be forgotten that the country has been in 
turmoil for two decades now. A light footprint 
thus  also  comes  with  a  price,  be  it  of  a 
different kind.  
 
Not all conflicts can be nipped in the bud. 
Ending  full-scale  inter-state  or  civil  war,  or 
preventing the latter from spilling over into the 
region,  even  when  Europeans  are  part  of  a 
broader  coalition  demands  large-scale 
operations, as will the inevitable post-conflict 
stabilisation. And for sure, training, assistance, 
SSR/DDR  and  peacekeeping,  either  pre- o r  
post-conflict, have to be sustained over many 
years to be effective.  
 
Europeans  will  shortly  withdraw  from 
Afghanistan,  but  already  now  it  is  clear  that 
on-going and looming commitments will not 
allow  them  to  withdraw  from  the  world. 
Somalia  and  Mali  will  demand  a 
presence  for  a  long  time  to  come, 
which may well need to be extended 
to  other  countries  in  the  Sahel.  The 
civil war in Syria when it finally ends 
will likely demand a military presence 
on the ground to keep the peace, if it 
does  not  require  preventive 
deployment  in  the  neighbouring 
countries  first.  Sustaining  these 
inescapable  commitments, 
shouldering  in  addition  a  fair  share  of  the 
burden of global collective security under the 
aegis of the UN, and the imperative of being 
able to respond rapidly and with major forces 
to any crisis in the near abroad: for this the 
existing HG does not suffice.  
 
“Europeans  will  withdraw  from 
Afghanistan,  but  on-going  and 
looming  commitments  will  not 
allow  them  to  withdraw  from  the 
world”   7 
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AMBITIONS RENEWED AND ENHANCED  
What  level  of  ambition  would  be  both  real, 
relative to the threats to Europe’s interests, and 
realistic,  relative  to  its  political,  economic  and 
military weight?  
 
  A permanent strategic reserve: the ability 
to mount a decisive air campaign and to 
deploy up to an army corps, as a single 
force if necessary, for combat operations 
in Europe’s broader neighbourhood, over 
and above all on-going or envisaged pre- 
and  post-conflict  operations,  in  the 
neighbourhood  or  beyond,  of 
collectively  up  to  another  army  corps. 
This  de  facto  “double  Headline  Goal” 
may seem fanciful at first sight, but it is 
but  the  reflection  of  the  rate  of 
deployment of the last decade.  
  Maritime  power:  the  ability  to  achieve 
command  of  the  sea  in  the  broader 
neighbourhood,  while  maintaining  a 
global  naval  presence  in  order  to 
permanently  engage  with  partners, 
notably in Asia and the Arctic.  
  Regional  strategic  autonomy:  acquiring 
all  strategic  enablers,  including  air  and 
maritime  transport,  air-to-air  refuelling, 
and ISTAR, to allow for major army, air 
and  naval  operations  in  the  broader 
neighbourhood  without  reliance  on 
American assets.  
  Strategic  planning:  the  capacity,  within 
the  European  External  Action  Service, 
to  engage  in  permanent  contingency 
planning incorporating all instruments at 
the disposal of the EU and the Member 
States,  including  sanctions,  civilian 
missions, and military operations, and in 
case of the latter being decided upon, to 
liaise  with  any  military  headquarters 
conducting  it.  Without  this  permanent 
civil-military  strategic  planning, 
Europeans  can  never  hope  to  achieve 
regional  strategic  autonomy.  Effective 
preventive  action  or  rapid  reaction  will 
then  depend  on  coincidence  rather 
than design.  
 
Based  on  its  definition  of  interests,  priority 
responsibilities,  and  capability  objectives,  the 
European  Council  could  then  decide  on  a 
number  of  taskings,  to  be  achieved  by 
December 2014.  
 
An important task would be to translate its 
decisions  into  updated  and  broadened 
illustrative scenarios by the EU Military Staff, 
which  in  turn  would  generate  updated 
capability  requirements.  In  parallel,  the 
European Council could launch a reflection on 
the major enabling capabilities that Europeans 
aim to develop in the long term, by 2030 and 
beyond, in order to be able to live up to their 
enhanced ambitions. Such a reflection could be 
undertaken at ministerial level, led by the High 
Representative, and fed by input papers by the 
EU  Military  Committee,  the  EDA,  the 
Commission, and perhaps a wise pen group. 
Starting  from  a  quite  concrete  question,  this 
reflection  can  generate  more  permanent  and 
structured  ways  of  thinking  about  defence 
planning  between  Member  States,  ultimately 
leading  to  harmonization.  Finally,  the  High 
Representative  and  the  EEAS  can  be  tasked 
with  elaborating  a  proposal  for  a  strategic 
planning capacity.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Strategy  has  to  drive  the  acquisition  of  the 
means, but also decision-making. The point of 
setting  priorities  is  that  when  the  next 
contingency arises, decision-making should be 
faster, and mandating action by the able and 
willing Europeans under the political aegis of 
the  EU  should  be  easier.  Thus  a  truly 
comprehensive  approach,  integrating 
operations  under  whichever  command 
structure the able and willing have recourse to 
with  the  entire  toolbox  of  the  EU,  should 
become reality.  
   8 
 
 
“A  more  explicitly  shared  view  of  the 
strategic context would be essential to steer day-
to-day choices and help shape decisions with a 
long-term impact on budgets, on investment, on 
personnel.  It  should  in  any  case  not  be  an 
academic  exercise  but  be  geared  toward 
operational  conclusions  and  results”:  this 
academic  surely  subscribes  to  this  final  quote 
from  Herman  Van  Rompuy’s  speech  at  the 
EDA. 
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